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ABSTRACT 
Sorne markets are characterized by a systematic reladon between how costly it is for 
consumers to observe prices, market power, and incentives to reduce eosts. This paper offers 
a model of 8uch markets and discusses incentives to invest in cost reduction. 1 develop two 
partial equilibrium models, aue static, other dynamic, where teclmology is determined 
endogenoussly throug stochastic investment, finns set prices, entry is free. and consumers 
search for prices. 1 use the static model to discuss market power and price controls. and tbe 
dynamic model to discuss cost volatility and predation. 
*I thank Paco Andrés. Mark Machina, Cristina Mazón, John McMilIan, Gary Ramey and special1y Joel SobeJ 
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1 Introduction 
Sorne markets are charaderized by a systematic relation belween how mstIy it is for consumers to 
observe prices1, market power, and firms' incentives to reduce casts. Costly consumersearch gives firms market 
power, since consumersaccept prices aboye the minimurncharged in the market, bui affects firms with different 
costs differently. Lowcost firms are noi constrained by consumersearch because they charge the lowest price, but 
high cost firms are. Thus, a rise in incentives to search (i.e., a fall in the reservation price), forces high cost 
firms to lower their prices, and redistributes COIlS\lJIIa'Sto low cost finns, which inereases the marginal benefit 
oí cost reduroon. 
The following retail industJy cases illusfrate tbis relation, although neither is a. perfect example. 
Chrysler" s Bob Eaton ([he Economist, 14 Feb. 1998, pp. 71 ~3) reports that 1/4 of American cae buyers will use t h e 
Internet in 98 and 1/2 by 2000. Most will use the Internet only to obtain information (e.g., how much a dealer 
pays for a car), that alLows them to bargain lower prices out of Local traditional deaIers. That is, Intemet 
reduces serach costs and thereby market power. Other consumers, however, wiIL buy directly from dealers 
selling cars on~line al lower prices than traditional relailers2• Those dealers afford cheaper rates, because 
developing an on~line sales system arnounts to creating a new, lower cost retail technology, with a smaller sales 
fOl'lCe, savings on shop and warehouse C05ts, and belter inventory managemenl It is the Internet that both 
1 Thi& muket imperfection due lo CQ18IlIne8 having imperfecl infonmltim about pri~ genaale!J price diapenlion (McMillan &: 
RothBchild (92), Benabou (93), Stahl (89), Roo (85), Burdett 6: fudd (83), cm.on &: MeAfee (83), Varian (80), MaeMinn (BO), Reingomum 
(79». 
2 Independently oí this a ronoolidation procesa ia aIso taking place. The model presented ahead predicts aloothat ¡ower geal'clt roalu lea<! 
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reduces serach costs and allows the new technology, but these are different things as the example shows. 
Similar exarnples can be foundin the relail brokerage industry, or the bookand compact disc retail industries. 
This paper offers a modelof markets charaderized by a systematic relation between consumersearch, 
market power, and cost reducing investment, and discusses incentives to reduce costs. 1 deve10p two parha! 
equilibrium models, one static other dynamic, where technology is detennined endogenously through stochastic 
investment, firms set prices, entry IS free, and consumers search for prices. 1 use the static model to discuss 
market pOWer (the ability to rise price aboye marginal cost) and price controls, and the dynamic model to 
discusscoslvolatility and predation. 
The basic static model is a three stage game. In the first stage firms invest in cost reduction; in the 
secondstage firms choose prices; and in the third stage consumerssearch and buyo The dynamic model has two 
periods, each composed of three stages. The {irst period unfolds as the static modelo In the second, first firms 
suffer a (technological ormonetary) cost shock, and then pricing and search are repeated. The model is dynamic 
because consumersbuy repeatedly (Senabou (93), Cressy (83), Fishman & Rob (95), McMillan & Morgan (84), 
Tornmasi(94», and marginal costsvary over time. 
The paper makes Ove ooservations. First, that stochastic inveshnent is a way of endogeneizing cosl 
heterogeneity in the Reinganum (79)~MacMinn (80) mode!. Suppose firms can produceat a basic unit cos1, which 
through an investment, whose outcomeis uncertain, they can try to reduce. Cost heferogeneity is then the result 
of investment's randomness. This, embodies two concepts: first the creation of a new production process involves 
irreducible ex ante uncertainty (Lippman & Rumelt (82», and second, firms can influence, at a cost, their 
technological type. My model can be inlerpreted as a double search model, where firms search for technology 
(Evenson& Kislev (76), Telser (80), Reinganum (82), Nelson (82», and consumerssearch for prices. 
There are two opposing views on how market power affects incentives to reduce costs, on the research 
and development (R&D) literature, and the agency literature that investigates if the market reduces agency 
problems. One view holds that downward pressure on prices is needed to induce cost reduction. A firm can 
always profit from reducing costs3 . Bul when high cost firms can charge high prices, cost reduction is less 
valuable. While downward pressure on prices, erodes high cost firms' profits, rnaking cost reduclion more 
valuable. 1 caH this the Classical conjecture. The second view consists of two parts. First, market power is 
necessary to induce cost reduction. Market power generates the quasi~rents required to cover inveshnent 
expenditures. And smce it is the prospect of high profits that induc~costreduction, and since profits are higher 
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the bigger the market power, the higher the market power, the bigger the incentives to reduce costs. Second, 
the welfare gain from costreductioncompensates the loss from price differing from marginal cost (randon (84), 
Nelson & Winter (82». 1 cail tbis Schllmpeter's C01ljecture (47).4 
The second observation is that the relation between market power and cost reduction depends on th e 
contexto This clarifies underwhich conditions it is one ol the two opposing views that best describes a market, 
and agrees with the ambiguity ol the empirical literature on R&D (Cohen & Levin (89». 1 show that search 
cost shifts lead market power and investment to move in opposite directions, while dernand shifts can lead 
them to move in the same direction. Market power and cost redueing investment are both functions oí the 
parameters of tbe model (Dasgupta & Stiglitz (80), and the many sourees of market power (fixed eosts, cosUy 
search. transportation costs, patents, etc) affect the marginal benefit of investment differently. The reasoning 
underlying Schumpeter's conjecture is that a faH in market powerreducestotal profit, and thereby incentives to 
invest. But what matters is marginal, nottotal profit, and they need not move in the same direetion. A fall in 
market power can both rise the marginal profit and reduce total profit, if it impacts firms asymmetrically, 
eroding high cost firms' profits relatively more. 
Costreduction under the form of R&D is an important component of growth, and objed of many policy 
rneasures, partieularly in the European Cornmunity. The previous discussio", ealls attention to the fad that the 
relation between market power and eost reduction depends onthe nature of an indu5try. Poliey measures should 
refled this. 
The third observation is that in search markets, price controls may not affed cost reduction 
monotonically. As long as price controls hurt relatively more high cost firms, they stimulate cost reduction. 
Otherwise, they can reduceinvestmenL 
The fourth observation is that with switching casts, cost volatility can lead firms to charge below 
marginal cost, without predatory motives. 1 assumeít is cheaper for consumersto observe the currentprice ofthe 
firms they bought from previously, than from another firmo This creates a switching cost that tends to lock 
consumersto their period 1 suppliers. Due to the lock-in effect, firms need to establish a customer base, which 
might involve pricing below marginal costin the fírst period, if the reservation price is sufficienUy low. Notice 
also that sales maximization in period 1 is part of an intertemporal profit maximizing strategy, as in 
Klemperer (87a, 87b). 
---
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The fifth observation is that marginal cost volatility can lower cost reduction. I analyze two types of 
costvolatility: idiosyncratic costvolatility, which is a change in the ratio of the firm's cost to the lowest cost 
in the industry, and, industry wide costvolatility, which is an equal rise in aH firms' cosis. 
Idiosyncratic costvolatilityimpacts investment through three effeds, the moreinteresting of wmch is 
the following. When a produd is bought repeatedly, finding a low price firm is valuable for both current and 
futute consumption. if current prices convey information about future prices. A rise in intertemporal price 
variability, induced by relative cost volatility, lowers the infonnativeness of current prices about future prices. 
This reduces incentives to search, lowering investment. 
Industry wide costvolatilityimpacts cosireductionin twoways. First, it reducesequally the markup of 
both types offinns. Since lowcosifirmshave larger sales, they are relatively moreaffected. Second, it reduces 
incentives to search in period 2, further decreasing investment. 
There is empirical evidence suggesting inflation is positively correlated with relative price 
variability, both across markets (Domberger (87) and within markets (van Hoomissen, (88), Tommasi (93), 
Lach & Tsiddon(92), Vining & Elwertowski (76), Glejser, (65), Parks (78». Based onthese studies Tornmasi (94) 
and Fishman & Rob(95) identify idiosyncratic cost volatility with the resolt of the nonuniform propagation oí 
inflation acrossthe economy.If oneaccepts lhis, then inflation lowerscostreduction, and rises average costs. 
Next 1 ¡ntegrate the paper on the literature. Bagwell & Ramey (96) propose an alternative way of 
endogeneizing rost heterogeneity. They use a Rosenthal (80)~Varian (80)-Stahl (89) model, where identical 
firms paya fixed cost to make a deterministic rostreductioninveslment. 
A vast literalure (Arrow (62), Dasgupta & Stiglitz (80), Futia (80), Flaherty (80), Spence (84), 
developed models that reproduceSchumpeter's conjecture. For example, Dasgupta & Stiglitz (80) showed that 
for a syrnmetric Coumot oHgopoly, with free entry, where the marginal cost is detennined by a deterministic 
investment, the degree of concentration is positively correlated with investment. Since in their model 
concentrationis positively correlated with the price level, market powerand investmentvary positively. Here 
market power results from the fixed cost nature of R&D expenditures, and tbat ex post linns are identical. 
Several authors (Hart (83), Scharfstein (88), Hermalin (92), Martin (93), Schmidt (97) modeled, witb 
tnixed results, how the market couldreduceagency problems. For example, Schmidt (97) showed that a rise in 
the numberof competitors, on the one hand, ¡nereases the probability of liquidation, which rises managerial 
effort, onthe other hand, reducesthe firm's profits, which decreasesmanagerial effort. 
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Fishman & Rob(95), Tommasi(94), Benabou & Gerlner (93), Benabou (93), Benabou (92), Benabou (88), 
showed t hat in search markets a raise in relative price variability orinflation lowers the incentives 10 search. 
This allows high cost firms to rise their prices leading to a higher price expectation and variance. 
1 develop the static modelin sedion 2, and in section 31 charaderize its equilibriwn. i ruscuss market 
power in section 4, price controls in section 5, and present two extensions to the static model in section 6. 1 
develop the dynarnic model in section 7, and in section 8 I describe its equilibrium. In section 9 1 discuss cost 
volatility, predation and inflation. The proofs of Lemma2 and Propositions 2 and 3 are given in appendix since 
they consist oE straightforward applications of the implicit function theorem. The dynamic model is formaHy 
development in a technical appendix available from the author uponrequest. 
2 The Static Model 
In this section T present the static model. 
Considera market for a homogeneous{search) goodthat opensfor oneperiod. 
[lnserl figure 1 here] 
The game consists oí three stages (figure 1). In stage 1 firms simultaneously choose investments¡ each 
firm observes onIy ¡ts cost realization. In stage 2 finns simultaneously choose prices. In stage 3 consumers 
simultaneously make their search and purchase dedsions¡ then production and delivery take place 
instantaneously, agents receive their payoffs, and the market closes. 
There is a continuumof consumersof unit measure. Consumersare idenlical and risk neutral A conswner 
who buysat priee p demandsx(p;6J, where x(.): (O,+oo)x(O,+oo) .-------,. (0,+00) is a twice differentiable, bounded 
fundion, with a boundedinverse, decreasing and strictly concave onprice and increasing on 6, a parameter that 
measuresthe level ofdemand. Denote the surplusofa consumerwhopays p by S(p;6) :== J x(t;i5)dl. 
p 
To obtain a price quote from a firm a consumermusl paya constant amount oE(O,+<><»: the search costo 
Search is instantaneous, a consumermay solidt any nwnberofprice quotes, and mayal any time accept any offer 
received to date. 1 assume: 
(A.l) Each consumerpicks al randomwhich firm tosample, from the set of Hons whose price he doesnotknow. 
A eonsumer's infoTmlltion set just after his k-lh search (or return) step eonsists oi all the priees 
previously observed. A consumer's stage 3 strategy is a stopping rule, that for every possible search eost, and 
sequenceof observations, says whether search should stop orcontinue; denote it by s. A conswner's payoff is the 
expected consumersurplus, net of the seareh expenditure. 
-
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There is a continUwnof firros oí unit measure. Firms are risk neutral and may differ in their margmal 
productioncosls. 
A firm's costredudng investment aE[O,+oo) generates marginal cost level CI with probability /.I(a), and 
marginal cost level ch with probability 1 - p(a), where O ~ C, < Ch < +oo. This specification contaios four 
assumptions: first, marginal productioncosts are constant; second, the cost type distribution is at most binary5; 
thrrd, each firm's probability of having a low cost depends only on ¡ts investment6 and fourth, the supporl of 
the cost distribution is independent of the firms' individual and aggregate investments. 1 assume f/(.): [0,+<><» 
~ (O,1}is a tlvice differentiable function, with: j.I "(a) < O <j.I'(a), Va~O; j.I(OJ ==0; p(a) < 1. Va<+<><>; and !!!!!. 
/.I(a) = 1. These assumptiOnS imply that inveslment induces first order stochastic (leftward) shifts in the cost 
distribution; noinveslment induces a degenerate disrribution at c = Ch; and firms can never gel a low cost with 
probability 1. 
Cost reducing investment could be a process innovation that reduces the eost of producing existing 
products, a managerial innovation that rises productivity, or an investment in capital that increases the 
marginal productivity of labor1. 
Denote the per consumerprofit of a firm with cost c, who eharges price p by n(p;c~) := (p - c.)x(p;o) 
(.=/,11). Lel p:; := argm;x'l1(p;cT). 1 caH p:; the oostc~ firm's monopoly price. By strict concavity oí demand p:; 
is unique and strictly inereasing in C~. Denote the price of a firm with cost CT by p" and the expected consumer 
measure{orshare) of a firm that cahrges pricep by rp(p). A firm's expected profit equals the firm's per conswner 
profit, times the firm's expected consumermeasure; denote it by: JI( P..;cT,rp( p) -= n( P..;cT)rp( p). 1 assumeonly low 
cost firms cancharge pi without losing money, Le., pi < Ch. 
When a finn chooses to eharge a price rugher than the maximum consumers are willing to pay, and 
henceforgoesthe chance oE seIling its product, 1 say the firm is inacnve¡ otherwise 1 say the firm is active. 1 
assumethat consumerscanonly learn whether a fion is inactive through search. 
A firm's infonnation setjust before stage 2 consistsof the firm's investment and eostrenlization. A firm 's 
stage 1 strategy is an inveslment level. A firm's stage 2 strategy is a pricing rule t hat foc each possible history, 
says which price the firm should charge. A firm's payoff is expected profit, net of the investment expenditure. 
5 It is slraighlfolWard to generalize the mode1 fOI non-decreasing marginal costa and a continpum -of cost !)'pes. 
6 That is, fuere areno extemalities. A simpleway of modelingexternalities iS:/l(a(I),A), A = J .1I(I)dt, Jla >0, /lA > O. 
7 5ince the low cost t:eclmology can be used by all firms !hat succeed at cost reduction, but only fuose, I am implicit1y assuming fuat 
patent protection is unavailable but imitation is as costly as research. 1 make trus assumption due to fue encompassing notion nI cost 
reduction, and to avoid externalily issues. The problems associated wifu patents (Le., appropriabilily) are essentially extemalities 
problems(Spence (M». The re1ationbetween roncentration, appropriability,and incentives to cost reduction 18 analyzed by !he patent 
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The solution concept ls a refinement of Nash equilibrium. Fiest 1 restrict aUention to symmetric pure 
strategies. Recall that consumersare identical, and that after uncertainty is resolved there are two finn types. 
Next 1 introduce the two remaining restrictions. Consumersdonotknow the prices charged by individual firms. 
However, they hold beliefs abaut the price distribution across firrns. 1 assume8: 
(A.2) Consumers' search strategy satisfies sequentiai rationality, Le., conswners choose whether to search 
again to maximize oet expeded surplus, given the previously observed prices and their conjecture oí the 
price distrihution at the unsearched flons, conditional onany observed informaban. 
(A.3) Consumers'beliefs abaut the price distribution satisfy the independent prices conjecture, ¡.c., consumers 
bclieve firms choose prices independently and maintain this assumption throughout the search process. 
The first condition implies Ihat consumers behave optimally at every information sel, given their 
beliefs about the firms' sfrategies. The second implies that consumersdo not change their beliefs regardless of 
what prkes they observe9, and thal on the equilibrium path, the consumers' beliefs agree with the price 
disfribution induced by the firms investment and pricing strategies. 
Let the cumulalive distribution fundion, F(.), give the consumers' beliefs about the (unconditionaI) 
market price distribution1IJ, and let E and p denote the lowest and highest prices onthe support of FU. 
An equilibrium is: a stopping rule, consumerbeliefs, a pricing rule for each cost type, and an inveshnent 
level, {s', F' (.J,p;, Ph' a'}, such that: 
(i) Given beliefs F" (.) and the search cost a¡ consumerschoose stopping rule s" to maximize net expected surplus; 
(in Given stopping rule s' , and costlevel c" firms choosepricing rule p;, and inveshnent level a ", to maximize 
net expected profit, i.e., to respectively solve the problems: 
max IT(p;c,,!jl(p», .=l,h 
, 
m,!'" J./(a) IT(p;c",jI{p» + [1- J./{a)] II(p;c",!jl(p» - a 
(iii) Beliefs F"(.) agree with the price distrmulion inducoo by jnvestment level a", and pricing rules P:: . 
81 foUowBagweU &: Ram"}' (96). The followingresbiclionsare varialions of Kreps &: Wilson's (82) conccpts of s~quential ""tionulity ¡¡nd 
rxJIIsiste.nf beliefs. They are a generalizalion of subgame perfeclion lo incomplete information games, whose pw:pose is lo rule out 
unreasonable Nash equilibria. For example, suppose consumers reject all prices ahove rr. Given the consumers' behavior, it is an 
equilibriumfor fumsto charge p¡-. Thus, the consumero' behaviorisoptimalalong: the equilibrium path. To rule out such equibbria (see 
equation (3)) two conditions are required. Firstconsumers should optimize hom each point on. Sequcntial ralionality ensures trua. But., if 
when they observe a price higher than p¡ - consumers revise their exceptions lo believe that the other fums charge much lower prices, it 
is slillsequentiaUyrational for them to reject any price above fl- . Thus, additionaUy consmners should not revise their expedations when 
[aced wilh an unexpected price, i.e., the consumers· belicls should salisfythe independent prices conjecture. 
9 There isa largenumber of smaU ex ante identicalfirms. Hence, a price observation does not provide infonnation that a consumer can 
use torevisee"Pectations. In addilion. pricing decisions are viewed as independent. Hence, a consumer who obselves an unexpected 
p'?ce will nol change his e"Pectations over the prices citarged by other firms. 
-
3 Characterization of Equilibrium 
In this section r construct the equilibrium by working backwards. First, given the consumers' behefs 
about the price distribution, 1 derive the consumers' equilibrium search behavior, which consísts of holding a 
reservation price. Second, given consumers' equiHbrium search behavior and firms' costs, 1 derive the firms' 
equilibrium pricing behavior. Low cost firms are always active and charge their monopoly price. High cost 
finos are sometimes active and others inactive, which allows for two types of equilibria. When high cost firms 
are active they charge the minimum of the reservation price and their monopoly prke. Third, given firms' 
equilibrium pricing behavior, ¡ derive the firrns' equilibrium investment behavior, which consists of equating 
expected marginal benefit to marginal cost. Finally, 1 establish existence oí equilibrium of the whole game. 
3.1 Stage 3: The Search Game 
In this sub-sectionI charaderize the consumers'search equilibrium. 
Given (A.2) consumersoptimize with respect to beliefs, which given (A.3) do not depend of the prices 
observed. Thus, the consumer'ssearch problemcan be solved usingdynamic programming. Undermy assumptions 
sequential search is optimal (Morgan & Manning (85), proposition 3). 
Denote the maximum expeded surplus, net of the search expenditure, of a consumer who's best 
available offer is p and behaves optimally by V (p;o,ó). After each draw a consumermustchoose between one of 
Iwoactions: accept the best available offer and terminate search, the value oí which is S(p;6), or, draw a new 
price at cost a; and subsequently behave optimally, the expected value of which IS K (o);"" o + 
fV(p'*p,ó) dF(p', where p" = rnin{p,p'}. Search should stop when a sufficiently aUractive price is observed. 
The BeIlman equation of the consumerproblemis: 
V(p;o,ó) =m",,{S(p;ó), K(o)} (1) 
Given that demandis boundooand (A.1), (1) has a well defined and finite optimal value fundioo, and optimal 
search tenninates in a finite numberof steps with probability 1 (De Graot: Lernma 1, p. 350, Th. 1, pp. 347). 
Given that Sp< O, that S(+oo;{j)::;; K (.¡--oo) < K (o) < S( E;{j), for ~O,+oo), and that the value of search is 
decreasing in a¡ it follows from the intermeruate value theorem that for every cE(O, a J, (j s; +00, equation 
, 
S{p;6) =- a + fV(p*;o,ó)dF(p) 
, 
has a uniquesolution ~O,+oo). Given p, and using(2) and Sr < O, it follows that: 
f
S(P;Ó) 
V(p;o,6)-,=, 
Stíd\l 
~ p < p 
4= n :> n 
(2) 
(3) 
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and that the optimal search strategy consistsofholding a reservation price p. Using (3) 00(2): 
, 
JrS(p;o) - S(p;o)j dF(p) =0 
, 
(4) 
Equation (4) states that the reservation price, p, is chosen to equate the marginal cost oí search, a, to the 
expected marginal benefit (len side). From (4) it follows that Eor every strictly positive search cost, the 
reservation price is stricUy bigger that the lowest price charged in the market: \1'0>0. ~ < p. That is, costly 
search gives firms market power, since conswnersaccept prices ahoye the minirnurncharged in the rnarket. 
3.2 Second Stage: The Pricing Game 
In this suh-section 1 charaderize the prices charged in equilibrium. 
If a firm charges a price higher than the reservation price, p > p, it makes no sales. If a firm charges a 
price nobigger than the reservation price, p,,;; p, given (A.l) and that there is a continuumof consumersand 
firms, it gets an expeded measure oí COflSl1II'UtrSequal to the measure of consumers divided by the measure of 
active firms. Thus, the expected measure of consumersoí a finn that charges pis: 
<= p > p 
where nis the measure of active firms (1 omit nin if!). Since r < p, n> O. 
Lemma 1: In equilibriurn11 : (i) Price is non-decreasing in the cost level: E = PI !i: Ph = ¡;; (ii) The low cost 
firms' price is strictly lower than the reservation price: PI < Pi (üi) Lowcost finns charge their monopoly price: 
PI = p;¡(iv) When the reservation price is nosmaller than the high eost level, high cost finos charge the 
minimumof the reservation priee and their monopoly price; otherwise, high eost firms becomeinadive: 
<== eh > P 
Proof: 
(i) 
inequalities and usingthe definition ofn (P";P,cj one gets (Ch - c¡)[D(p¡¡ó)if!(p¡;p) - D(Ph;Ó)if!(Ph,P»:2 0, which is 
false sincetf¡(.,p) is non-inereasing inp and D(.;ó) is strictly decreasingin p. ThuSPI!i: Ph' 
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(ii) Follows from a>O, e < p, and (i). 
given. Thus, only per consumerprofit matters for the determination oí their optirnaJ priee. Suppose PI" pi. 
Consider first PI = p' < pi. There is a e> O sufficiently small such that p' + e < p. Thus, if a low cost firm 
deviates and charges p' + e, it loses nocustomers, and by strict concavity of the per consumerprofit it rises its 
profit, Thus, PI ~ pi· Now supPose, PI = p' > pi. If a low costfirm deviates and charges PI = pi, given the 
independent prices conjecture, and by definition pi it increases its profit. Thus, e !i: pi, and therefore, PI = pi. 
(iv) Consider first Ch < p. When p> Pi:' jt follows that Ph = Pi:' by the reasoningin om. So consider p s: pi. 
Firmscan make a positive profit sothey nevercharge Ph > p. And, if they charged Ph < p, then they could, as in 
UiH, rise profit without losing customersbyrising price to p. It foUows that Ph =min{p, p'hl forCh ~ p. When p < 
Ch high cost firms can charge any price higher than the reservation price and make a ZetO profit; otherwise 
they make a negative profit. 
Denote the realized value oi variable 11 by p. Using Lemma 1, when the reservabon price i s no smaUer 
than the high cost level, all firms are active; otherwise only low costfirms are active: 
pE[ch,+oo) 
[Insertfigure 2here] 
5ince low cost firms a]ways charge the lowest price in the market, they are never constrained by 
consumersearch and always charge their monopolyprice P;" (figure 2). 12 
High cost finns also benefit trom the market power generated by costly search, by charging a higher 
price than low cost íirms. However, they may still be discipHned by consumer search, depending on how 
credible the threat oí a secondsearch is. When the reservation price is high, i.e., p> P;~, the threat is not 
credible, sohigh cost finos charge their monopoly price, pZ'. For inlermediate values of the reservation prite, 
Le., eh s: p< Pi:', high cost finns are active, but the threat is credible, so they are forced to reduce their prite 
below the monopoly leve!. When the reservation price is low, i.e., p< Ch, high costfirms becomeinadive. 
Thus, there can be two types oí prite equilibria. At a One-Priu equilibrium, which occurs when th e 
reservation price is below the high cost leve], p< Ch, only low cost finns are active and charge their monopoly 
12 Thisis DÚlmolld's Pamdox (71) (Davis &; Holt (96»: low cost firms charge their monopoly price, regardless of how high it is, how low 
the search costis,and how many firms there are. Thisisnot nceded for my results. Stahl's model, does not necessarily have Diamond's 
paradox and gives similar results. My model's advantage is that it has equilibrimIl in syrnmetric pure strategies, and aIlows cost 
10 
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price. At a Two-Price equilibriuffi, which occurs when the reservation price i5 no smaUe[ Ihan the high cost 
leve1, eh s: P, both types of firms are active; low cost firms charge their monopoly priee, and high cost firms 
charge the minímumof their monopoly price and the reservation price. 1 wíll caH a Two-Price equilibrium 
constrained orunconstrained, depending Oll whether the reservation prite IS IDwer or higher than the high cosl 
firmg' monopoly price, respectively. The firms' expeded consumer shares are constant within each type of 
equilibrium, and change as the model switches belween types of equilibrium. When high cost firms are active 
consumerssearch muy once. When high costfirms are inactive, onaverage consumerssearch morethan once. 
Usiog Lemma 1, the market cumulative distribution function of prices IS: 
<0= P <PI 
(5) 
3.3 Stage 1: The Investment Game 
In tbis sub-sedion 1 charaderize the investment equilibrium. 
Assume ¡¡ '(O) i8 big enough13 to guarantee it is never optimal to set inveslment to zero.The necessary 
condition for the investment problemis: 
(6) 
Condition (6) states that the optimal investment, a~, equates the expeded marginal beneHt to marginal cost, 
where marginal benefit 18 the difference belweena firm's profit levels ofwhen it has a lowand a high costo 
3.4 Equilibriumof the Whole Game: Existence and Stability 
In tbis sub-section 1 prove exislence and discussstahility. 
Using 1.emma 1 equation (6) defines the firms' investment best responsefunction: 
a=A(p;6) (7) 
At One-Price or unconstrmned T'luo-Price equilibria, inveslment14 does nol depend 00 the reservation price. Al 
constrained Two-Price equilibria, investment faHs with the reservatian priee. When a rise in fue reservation 
price callSes high cost firms to becomeadive, investment falls discontinuously15. Investment rises with demando 
Let ª;'" A(n.m;O),a:= A(y,-e;+oo), e>O, The investment best response fundion is of the fonu: 
13 Tha! is./J'(O} > 11/[T1( R- ;ó,q} - TI( ,r ;5,q,}ll. 
~! The charad""ization of the investment and sea:rclt bestresponsefunctions followsfrom the implicitfunction Iheorem. 
12 
Al.): [pr,+oo)x(O,+oo)_ [!!-a], and is differentiable, except at p = Ch' where it has a downward 
discontinuity: A(q.;ÓJ< lim A(p;ÓJ. 
p_oj. 
T assume the realized measure of low cost firms equals the expeded measure of low cost firms: ¡.t '" 
J ¡.tlali)} 1i.16 Given symmetry it follows that: 
" ~= f¡.t(a(i))di =Jt(a) 
o 
,i,e., ~= p(a),with ¡i"<O< /.t'. 
Using (5) and (8), equation (4) defines the search best responsefunction: 
p= R(a;b,a) 
(B) 
(91 
The reservation price falls with investment and demand, rises with the search cost, is of the fOITI1 
R(.): [0,+(0) x (0,+00) x (0,+00) _ ~i ,+00), and is continuouslydifferentiable. 
Equilibrium is given by equations (7) and (9), 
[Inserl figure 3 here] 
To discuss stability (figure 3) consider the following adjustment process, consisting of a succession oí 
rounds,each composedof two stages. In fue first stage oí each rOlUld,firms choose an investment wruch is a best 
response to the reservation price chosen by the consumersin the previous round. In the second stage, consumers 
choosea reservation price which is a best responsesto the investment chosen by finos in the first stage oI that 
rotmd17 . A steady state {a· ,p.} ofthe adjustment processis an equilibrium: {a· ,p.} "" lA(p* ;ó),R(a"";6,o)}. An 
equilibrium {a·, p.} is locally asymptotically stable for the adjusbnent process, if there exists a neighborhood 
of {n° ,p.} such that for any initial point on the neighborhood, the adjusbnent process converges to{n° ,po}; 
otherwise an equilibrium is unstable. Denote the slope oí the inveshnent and search best response curves on the 
investment and reservation price space (d al dp)¡, i = A,R, respectively. 
Proposition 1: (i) Equilibrium exists1S,19, (ii) A sufficient condition for uniqueness, is that globally the 
search best response curve is steeper than the investment best response curve20, i. e., 
(da) (da) > O dPA-dpR (10) 
(iii) When (10) holds locally, equilibria are locally asymptotically stable, otherwise equilibria are unstable.. 
16 'l1tisassumptionisjuslifiabl .. because the investment bialsatemade independently. 
17 Th .. process ismyopic since agents ignore the way that their current adion will:influence their opponent's action in !he next lound. 
18 In stage 2.. when the reservation price equals the high cast level, th""e are two additional type¡ of equilibria.ln both low cast fim>S 
playa symmelric pure skategy. High cost firms, in one equilibrium randomize between charging the reservation price aTld becoming 
inadive, and in the other play an asymmebic purestrategy, 
19 It is possibl .. toshow Ihat Two-Price and OIUl-Price. equilibriaoverlap far a nOTl-emply set oí sea:rclt costs (figure2), 
20 The marginalbenefit 01 sea:rclt is relatively more sensilive lo the reservation price than lo investment.. and the marginal benefit of 
14 
Proof: 1 omit 6 in the notation. Let ah ;= R-1(chiO) .21 Replacing (9) on (7) afie gets the mapping A(ap) := 
A(R(a;a» which is af the fonn A(.): [0,+00) x (0,+00) __ [!!,a-], and is continuouswith respect to u, except at 
ah.1 where it has upwarddiscontinuity 11.( q,;a) < lím A( a.u) (A(.) falls withp, and RU with a j. Letz( a;o);= 
a_o¡ 
A(ap) -a, z: [0,+00) x (0,+00) -- m. 
(i) By Ta"kj'dixed pOintth,o«m Ár.), has a fixed point focev""y aon (O, +00). 
(ii) Sincez(O;a) > O, z(+oo;O'):s: O, VoE(O,+oo), a sufficient condition for uniquenessis oz/oa < 0, i.e., oz/oa 
(oAlop) (oRlaa) -1 < 0, or, ?JAlop= Coa/op)A> (oaj?Jp)'[I.. = COK·l/Op). 
(ili) Equatioru; a' ~ Al';"), and,; ~ Rla';a) am b, <ollap"d into a' ~ A(Rla"';a)) Taking a fi"t o,d", 
approximation around an equilibrium la*,p*¡ onegets, al (ApR,J a!-l = K, (1( is a constant). The condition for 
stability is: I ApR,,1 <1 or A"Ra < 1 sinceApRa>O. en 
At One-Price and unconstrained Two-Price equilibria condUion (lO) holds trivially. But there is a 
priori no(economic) reason why condition (10) should hold uniformly a t constrained Two-Price (example in sub-
section 4.1). Hence, oueof the implications of the model, is that for a given parameter vector, different levels of 
investment, prices and reservation price can arise as equilibria. 
4 Market Power and Cost Reduction 
In this section 1 discuss the re1ation between market power and cost reduction. 1 show that difierent 
parameters can induce market power and investment to vary jointly in different ways. In particular, a search 
cost shift leads then to move in opposite directions, contradicting the first part of Schumpeter's conjecture. 1 
will focus on cOllStTained Two-Price equilibria since they have more intresting comparative statics. A t 
constTained Two-Price equilibria a fall in the reservation price reduces: the high cost firms' price, the average 
price, and the high costfirms' mark_up22. That ¡s, a faH in the reservation price reduces (the high cost firms') 
market power. Thus, in an abuse of language 1 will identify the level oi market power with the level of the 
reservation price. 1 assumeconstrained Two-Price equilibria exist far more than onesearch cost23• 
Lemma 2: At constrained Two-Price equilibria: (i) a shift in the search cost leads invesbnent and the 
reservation price to co-vary negatively; (ii) if a rise in dernand is not bigger the higher the price (or 
alternatively if it doesnotmake the demandcurvesteeper), Le., 
21 Since R(O;o) = +""and R(+"";o) = O,for every oon (O,+oo), there ísa u~( o) on [0,+0<1) such that eh '" R(ah(o);o). 
22 A fall in the reservation price lowersaverage price by: reducing the high cost finns' price, and, rising investment (Le., proportion of 
~,:!wcost firms), and lowersthe relative mark·up byreducing the high cost fums'mark-up (the lowcostfinm;' price isconstant). 
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(11) 
then, a shift in the demand leads investment and the reservation price to ro-vary negatively24, and, if the 
following conditionshold: 
(12) 
then, a shift in demand leads investment and the reservation price to ro-vary positively. 
Lemma2 shows that the way market power and investment vary jointly as a result of parameter shifts 
does not depend on the stability properties ol equilibrium. 1 will focus on locally stable equilibria since they 
have moreinluitive comparative statics, i.e., 1 will use loca! stability as a selection criterion. 
Proposition 2:25 At locally stable constrained Two-Price equilibria: (i) a fall in the search cost reduces 
the reservation price, rises investment, and reduces total expected profit; (ii) a rise in demand reduces the 
reservation price, rises (reduces) investmentif (12) «(13) 26) holds, and leads total expeded profit to vary in a 
potentially ambiguousway. (iii) When a faH in the search cost or a rise in demand lead the model to switch 
from a Two-Price to a One-Price equilibrium, inveslment rises. 
First 1 will discusshow the reservation price and investment interaet. A rise in investment increases the 
proportion of low cost firms. This rises the expected marginal benefit of search, leading consumers to hold a 
lower reservation price. The inveshnent effectis the property that a rise in inveshnent reduces the reservation 
price: 3R/Oa < O. The low cost firms' per consumerprofit Leve!, n( p¡n ;{j,c,), is constant. Thus, the reservation 
price impacts marginal benefit of investment, if it affeds: the high cost firms' price, or, the firms' consmner 
shares. At constrainedTwo-Priu equilibria, a faIl in the resel'Vation price forces high cost finns to lower their 
price and earo a smaller per consumer prom. This rises the marginal benefit of investment. The price-
cumpetition effect 15 the property that a t consfrained Two-Priu equilibria a fall in the reservation price rises 
investment: 3A/3p < O. When the reservation price falls below the high cost level, high cost firms become 
inactive. Consumers move from high to low cost firms. This raises the low cost firms' expected consumer 
24 Aspecification of the demand fundíon that satisfies{l2) is;r(.;Il} = 6d(.)with d: (O,+O<» --,)o (O,+oo) and d' <: O. 
25 It is possiblc lo perform an additional oompmative statics exercise. Let ¡.¡(~;N be parametrized on iI. which measun'S the marginal 
productivity of inveslment or teclmological opportunities. Assume iI. rises the marginal productivity of inveslment, l.e., 1-14 > O. Then an 
increasein il.risesinveslment and reduces the reservation price. 
26 A rise in demand reduring the marginal hEnefit of investnlent is not a pathology peculiar to my modelo Quirmbach (88) showed that 
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measure, increasing the marginal heneHt oi investment The selection effectis the property that, when due to a 
faU in the reservation price, the madel switches between types DI equilibria, inveshnent rises. 
[Inserl figure 4 hetel 
Next 1 discuss how sh¡fts in the search cost and demand affect the reservation price and inveslment, 
When the search cost faUs (figure 4), the expected marginal benefit oi search must also fall for 
consumersto remain in equilibrium. Given investment, ¡.e., the proportion oi low cost finns, the reservation 
price falls. The fan in the reservation prke rises invesbnent, either through the price-competition effector the 
selection effect. The rise in investment furiher reduces the reservation price through the invesbnent efled. A 
fan in the search costreducestotal expeded profit, through the reservation price, 
(htserl figure 5 hetej 
A rise in demand (figure 5) impacts consumersdirectIy by making it relatively more valuable to find a 
low costfirm, Hence, the reservation price falls. A rise in demand also mereases inveslrnent indirectly, either 
through the price-competition effector the selection effect. 
A rise in demand expands sales. The direct impad on firms is composed of two effects of potentially 
opposite signs, First, if demand rises uniformIy, low cost firms are relatively more benefited because they have 
a higher mark-up. This rises the marginal benefit of investment. Second, if the demand rise is not bigger the 
higher the price, Le" j{ (11) holds, then low eost firms are further relatively more benefited, because they 
eharge a lower priee. Thus, if (11) holds both eomponents are positive and the direct ¡mpad is positive: Ad> 
0.27 Given (11), the direct ¡mpad reducesthe reservation price indirectly, through the invesbnent effect. 
lf 7J2X/OÓ?;P lS sufficientIy positive, the dired ¡mpad on firms is negalive, Le., Ad < O. But, the dired 
impad onfinns being negalive is not enough to lead to an overall fall in investrnent, while sUU leading to an 
overall decrease in the reservabon price, Since the indired ¡mpact onfirms rises investment, the direct ¡mpact 
has to be sufficiently slrong to dominate it, Le" Aó < - Ró Ap- And since the indirect impad on conswnersis 
positive, the direct ¡mpad has to besufficiently strang to dorrunate it, i.e., Aó> - (Ri R,). 
A rise in demand has a potentially ambiguous iropact on total expected profit. On t he one hand sales 
expand, onthe other, the reservation prke falls, 
Example: Lelx(p) =p_l.l, /.l(a) = 1- e-14.JQJ a, el =,02, eh = ,04, This example mustrates two points. First that 
associated with a given parameter vector there can be different equilibria. Second that at locally stable 
equilibria (the Hrst and the third) a fan in the search cost reduces the reservation price and rises investment; 
at unstable equilibria the opposite happens. 
01=.01(*) 02 = .009,999 
a p a p 
26900.051 226,009 26,900,260 226,008 
923.945 432,998 923.549 433,099 
913.747 436,375 913.959 436,273 
r'l Wilh !he exception of Ihe "",,<eh eco!,. ,,11 variable. are exp=d in 10.6 units. 'Il 
The reasoning underlying Schumpeter's ccm;ecture is that a faH in market power lowers total expected 
profit - the total expected benefit of inveshnent -, reducing incentives to invesl. But a decrease in market 
power is notnecessarily associated with a faH in total expected profit, as a rise in demand shows, nor with a 
fal! in the marginal expected profit, as a fall in the search cost shows, And what matters lS marginal" not total 
expected profit. A decrease in market power, induced by a fan in the search cost, is associated with both a rise 
in the marginal expected profit and a fall in the total expected profit, because of the asyrnmetric way in which 
the fall in rnarket powerimpacts firms' profits. The price-competition effect reduces the high cost firms' price 
and per consumer profit, while leaving the low cost firms' price constant. In addition the selection effed 
redistributes consumersfrom the high to the low cost firms. Thus, a fall in market power stimulates investment, 
evenif it reduces total expected profit, if it erodesthe high costfirms' total profit relatively more28 , 
When market power and investment movein opposite directions there is noSchumpeterian trade-off~. 
5 Price ControIs 
In Ihis section 1 show how price controlsmay not affect cost reduction monotonically in search markets, 
In markets govemed by Jevon's law oí one price, price controls affed prices unifonnly, However, in markets 
with price dispersion, only prices initiaJly aboye the ceiling are affeded directly, Thus, low and high cost 
firms may not always be affeded in the same way, 
28 In this mode1 the asymmetry assumes a very' ~ forms due to Diamolld's paradox. See fooolOte 13, 
29 It is aJso possibleto show the iollowing, First that we1fare is non-d.ecreasing in the search 0051. Second that for a fixed parameter 
vector, a risein the equilibriuminvestment reduces expeded profit. ilJId riseswe1fare. The implkatioll is that when mwliplicily occurs, 
equiIibriacan be ranked by welfare. Thus, my model provides ilJI instance of potential coordination lailure in tedmology creatUm, par.illel 
10 the coordination fallure for tedmology adopllon (Bagwell & Ramey (94), Farrell & 5aloner (85). Katz &; Shapiro (85». 1bird that the 
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Let pe denote price controL and let the price control be between the high cast level and the tninimum oí 
the reservation and the high cost firms' monopolyprice, eh";; p' :s: min{p, Pi: l. Low cast finns are not constrained 
in their pricing behavior. High rost firms are active, but constrained in their pricing behavior. Thus, a faH in 
the price control forces them to reducetheir price, tisiog the marginal benefit of investment. 
When the price control falls below the minimum of the reservation price and the high cost level, 
min{p,ckl, high cost firms becomeinactive. Investment rises through the se/ecHon effect. 
When the price control is between the low cost firms' monopoly price and the minimum of th e 
reservation price and the high cost level, pi :!:i: pe < min{p'Ch}' low cost finns continue to be unconstrained, thus 
the marginal benefit oí inveslment is constant. 
When the price control is between the low costand the low costfums' monopolyprice, c, < p~ < Pi", low 
costfirms becomeconstrained. Thus, a fal! in the price ceiling forces them to reduce their price. Since now th e 
marginal benefit of investment equals the low cost firms' profit, the marginal benefit of investment falls. 
When the price ceiling falls bellow the low cost level, pe < el, the market shuts down. 
6 Extensions 
6.1 Free Enlry and Fixed Enlry Costs 
In this sub-section 1 make two points. Pirst, that section 4's results are independent of the measure of 
finns being fixed. Second that market power and the measure oE firms in the industry can move in the same 
direction, contradicting usual interpretations of competition. 1 focusonconstrained Two-price equilibria. 
Let the gamehave an additional stage O, preceding the other three, where a continuwn DE finns on the 
positive realline decides whether to enter the industry. To enter the industry a firm mustpay a fixed cost. 
Proposition 3: At locally stable Two-price equilibria, a faIl in the search cost, or a rise in the fixed cost 
reducesthe reservation price and the measure of firms in the industry, and rises investment. 'Il 
A faH in the search cost reduces the reservation price and rises investment by the process described in 
section 4 The fall in the reservation price also reducesnet expected profit, through the price-competition effed. 
For firms to break-even the expected measure of consumersper ficm must rise, which happens if the measure of 
firms that enter the indushy falls. 
A rise in the fixed cost reduces the measure of firms in the industry. The ¡ncrease in the expected 
consumersshare per firm rises the marginal benefit 01 investment, which through the ilWestment effect reduces 
the reservation price, The faH in the reservation price, reduces net expected profit, through the price-
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competition effect, which reinforees both the tall in the measure of firms that enter the industry, and the rise 
in investrnent. However, by raising the prohability of a firm having a low cost, the increase in investment, also 
rises net expected profit, risiog the measure of firms that enter, but this eHect is dominated by the otherSlo. 
The expected marginal benefit oi inveshnent is composed oE hvo parts: the expected per consumer 
marginal benefit, and the expected consumermeasure. The assumption that the measure of firms in the industry 
is fixed, implies that a shift in a parameter, can only change the expected per consumermarginal benefit 
(within each type of equilibrium). Bul in general, a parameter shift will induce changes in both components, 
and those changes could be of opposite signs. These results show that the retation between market power and 
incentives to invest holds even when the expected consumermeasurecan change due to free entry31. 
Let n denote the measure of firms that enter the industry. If one takes 1/n as a measure of concentration, 
then a rise in the entry costrises concentration. This also occ.ursin Dasgupta & Stiglitz's (80) model. However, 
now, unlike in their model, market power and concentration co-vary negatively. This implies tha! 
concentration can be a misleading measure of market power and allocative efficiency32. 
6.2 Consumer Heterogeneity 
In this sub-section 1 show that if consumersare heterogeneous with respect to the search cosl:,. active 
firms may have different consumer measures, and, consumer search may impact inveslment fhrough an 
additional effed: the consumerredistribution effect. 
Let a proportionPEfO,l] oí consumershave a search cosi SI, and a proportion 1 - f1have a search costsh, 
where 0< SI:>". Sh < +oo. Each type of consumer has a reservation price. The reservation price of low search cost 
consrnners,the low reservation price, is nobigger than that ofhigh search cost consumers, the high reservation 
price, and strictly lower when the search cosls are different. 
low cost firms seU to both types of consumers.However, high cost firms tace a trade-off between profit 
maegin and volume of sales. When the low reservation price is suffidently high, or alternatively, when the 
proportion of low search cost consumers is suf{¡ciently big, high cost firms prefer to sell to both types of 
consumers;otherwise, high cost firms prefer to seU only to high search cost conswners. 
When, due to a fall in the low reservation price, high cost firms prefer to rise their price and sen only 
to high search cost consumers, expected consumershare is redistributed from high to low cost firms, rising the 
30 SimiI"rresulls,although for different reaoons, were found by:Rosenfual (80), V"rian (80), StiliI (89), Stiglitz (87) Seade (80). 
31 If fuere are e~temalities in Investment, Le., e"eh firm's probability of being 101\1 cost depcn.ds also un the Indusby's aggregate 
Investment expenruture, and if fuey are suffidently slrons- then a risein the fued rost stillreduces fue measure of finns that enter !he 
~dustry, but can alsodecrease investmen.t (Spence (80)), and rise the reservation price. 
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marginal benefit of investment. This ls the consumerredistribution ejjed. The rise in investment due to the 
consumerredistribution ef!ect is discontinuous(see footnote 14). 
7 The Dynamic Model 
In this section T present the changes necessary to obtain the dynamic modeL 
Let the market open for two periods, each of which is composed of three stages. In period 1 events 
unfold as in t he static model. In period 2, íirst finns suffer a shock to their marginal production costs; each firm 
observes only the outcomeof its ownshock. Second, firms simultaneously choose prices; customers tearn, free of 
charge, the current price of their previous period supplier. And third, consumers simultaneously make thei r 
search and purchase decisions; then production and delivery (cornment switching cosl)take place 
instantaneously, agents receive their period 2 payoffs, and the market clases. 
ToanaIyze t heimpact oí idiosyncratic costvolatility denote the probability that a firm who had a 
marginal produdioncostlevel e, in periad 1 has costlevel e.in period 2by v.,,(y) (7:,S =l,h). 1 assumethe shock is 
independent across all firms, and identically distributed across firms with the same cast type. 1 assume that 
the probability a period 110w costfinn remains low cost in period 2 is higher than the probability a period 1 
high cost firm becomes low cost in period 2: Vu > Vhl. Let the transition probability v ... be a differentiable 
function of yEN, a parameter which measures the intensity of the shock. 1 assume that a rise in y increases the 
probability of a Cirm changing ¡ts costtype: vj, < O < v!.¡. The probability oía firm having a lowcost in period 
Decomposethe high costasck =c,+ d, d > O; c¡ can be interpreted as a commoncost component. 1 wHI use 
deterministic shifts33 in el in period 2 to analyze the effeds of indllstry wide costvolatilihJ. 
8 Description of Dynamic Model's Equilibrium 
In this section1 make a brief description of the dynamic modeYs equilibrium. 
The consumers' period 2 problem and hence aptimal strategy is identical to that of the static modeI. 
The finns' period 2 problemis slightly different. If a Cirm is active, it keeps ¡ts period 1 customers, and 
in addition, it gels a share of the consumerssearching in period 2 (consumersthat in period 1 bought from a firm 
that is inactive in period 2)34. Nevertheless the optimal strategy ls identical to that of the static model. 
The consumers'period 1 problem is morecomplicated. Because consumerslearn far free the period 2 price 
of the firm they bought fromin period 1, they tend to buy at the same Cirm in both periods. Due to this lock in 
33 A stochastic shock, perfectly corre1aled across firms, generates the osame qualitative results and is barder to handle. 
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ejject35, consumersconducta morethorough search than they would lor a single purchase lo benefit from future20 
low prices and save onfuturesearch costs. hnplicit in this behavior is someinference oí futureprices onthe basis 
of past ones: if today's price is acceptable, one can expected that tomorrow's will also be acceptable. However, 
the optirnal strategy stiH consists of holding a reservation price, that equates the sumof the expeded marginal 
benefit of search for period 1 and 2 with the marginal search costo 
The firms' periad 1 problem is also morecomplicated. Due to the lock-in ef!ect, in period 2 a firm can 
only seU, either to ¡ts periad 1 customers, or to consumersthat are searching. Low cast finns will still choose to 
always be active and charge their monopoly price. However, when the period 1 reservation price falls below 
the high costlevel: if a high cost firm chooses to be active, onthe onehand, it sells ils product below marginal 
(and average) cost, on the other hand, it secures a larger customer measure íor period 2. 36 That is, high cost 
Cirms face a trade-off between current losses and future profits. For sorne parameter values they choose to be 
active, and for others inactive37, wruch allows for four types of equHibria far the whole game. When high cost 
firms are active they charge the minimumof the reservation price and their monopolyprice. Bul now high cost 
firros may choose to active even when the reservation price 15 below the high costlevel. 
The model has two interesting implications. First, that sales maximization in period 1 is part of an 
intertemporal profit maximization strategy. Second, that with switching costs, cost volatility cantead fmus to 
charge below marginal cost, without predatory38 motives. Due to the loc1v-in effed in period 1 finns need to 
establish a customer base for period 2, which might involve pricing be10w marginal cost, if the reservation 
price is sufficiently law. Also, here prices below marginal cost are charged by the smaller, higher cost firms. 
9 Cost Volatility and Cost Reduction 
In this section 1 argue that a rise in idiosyncratic or industry wide cost volatility can lead to a fall in 
invesbnent, and to rise in reservation prices. 1 concludeby discussingan application to inflation. 
34 A fum'sronsumer measure depends on hislory. However. because consumen; are identical and margínal ros/:g oonstant, priceJ> are 
independenl of!he fums' previous perlod consumer measures, and henre of history. 
35 For!he lock·in effect lo be present, aU that is required is lhat it rosts (significantly) less to leam Ihe current price of Ihe firm previously 
l:lronh:ed, !han of anolher .fum. 
6 When Ihe perlod 2 resenration price is above Ihe hlgh rost aU finns are active in perlod 2,. and no Consumen; search.. Wlum the period 
2 reservation prite islowerthan the high rosl, hlgh rosl finnsareinactive in period2, and the customers oI fums thal had a 10w ros! in 
peciO<! 1 bul become high ros! in perlO<! 2, search. ThU6. if a high rosl firm citooses to be active in perlO<! 1, it willhave a hlgner consumer 
share in period 2 !han it would if jt citose lo be inactive, sinee il gels a share of the customers searchlng and keeps ils period 1 customers. 
37 It is possibleto ensure that the sel of parameters for whlch hign cost firms are inactive in perlod 1 is non·empty. 
38 Joskow oc Klevorick (79); "Predatory pricing behavior invo1ves a reduction of price in the shorl run so as lo drive oompeting íirms out 
oí the markel or lo discoUlage entry of new firmg in an effort to gaín lager profits via higher prices in Ihe long ron Ihat would have been 
The impad of relative cost volatility on inveslrnent is composed of three effects; two of them, the 
relative price volatility effect and the propomon 01 costtypes effect, depend onhow search behavior in periad 
1 and 2 are affected, respectively; however, the third, the dired effect, is independent onof search behavior. 
A rise in idiosyncratic costvolatility rises the proporlion of firms that change their prices rrom periad 
1 to periad 2 to refled the variation in costs. This lowers the informativeness of current prices about future 
prices. As a result the expected marginal benefit of search in period 1 falls. Given the investment level, period 
1 reservation price rises, which when firms are constrained by period 1 search, reduces invesbnent, either 
through the priee-eompetition or the seleroon effeets. 1 caH relative price volatility effeet to the property 
that a rise in relative costvolatility reducesinvestment, through lts impad onperiod 1 reservation price. 
A rise in idiosyncratic costvolatility affects the period 2 proportion of low cost firms, and thereby the 
period 2 reservation price. Jf high cost firms are active, the change in period 2 reservation price affeds 
investment through, either the price-competiú'on effeet or the selection effeet. 1 caH proportion 01 cost types 
effect to the property that relative cost volatility affeds investment, through its effect 00 the period 2 
reservation price. 
Given prices, a rise in idiosyncratic costvolatility reduces a firm's period 2 expected profit conditional 
on the firm having a low cost in period 1, and rises a finn's period 2 expected profit conditional on the firm 
having a high cost in period 1. Hence, the expected marginal benefit of investment falIs. 1 call direct effect to 
the property that for constant prices, a rise in relative costvolatiUty reducesinvestment. 
The direct effeet reinforces the relative price volatility effeet. When in period 2 high cost firms are 
active, and the period 2 proportion of low costfirms is ron-increasins in the relative castvolatility, m6 ,;;,; O, the 
proportion of cast types elfect also reinforces the direct effect. The period 2 proportion of low cost firms being 
non-increasing in idiosyncratic cost volatility depends on: period 1 investment generating a high proportion of 
low cost finos, and, a change in relative cost volatility having larger ¡mpad on the probability of a low cost 
firm remaining low, than the probability of a high cost fitm becoming high. Thos, period 2 proportion of low 
cost finos is non-increasing in the relative cost volatiliúj, for example, when a change in relative cost 
volatility does not affed the probability of a hiSh costfirm becominglow, Vh¡ "" O. 
The impact oninvestment of a rise in industry wide costvolatility is composed of two effeds. First, 
given prices, a rise in industry wide cast volatility reduces the markup of both types of finos by the same 
amount.Since low cost finns have a larger volume of sales they are relatively more affected. Second, a rise in 
21 22 
indushy wide cost'Volatílity also rises both types of firms' monopoly prices, reducing the periad 2 marginal 
benefit of search. Hence inveslment faHs, either through the price-competition effect orthe se/ecHan effect .. 
As 1 mentioned in the introduction there lB empírical evidence suggesting that inflation 15 positively 
correlated with relative price variability, both across markets and within markets. TIús leads someauthors to 
ldentify idiosyncratic cost volatility with the result of t he non unifonn propagation of inflation across the 
economy. Consider an inflationary economy, where inflation is transmitted non-uniformly through the economy, 
so that different firms' costsare affected different1y, Le., firms are subjected to ldiosyncratic and industry wide 
shocks coming from physical productivity or monetary cost changes. H one ls prepared to accept that 
idiosyncratic cost volatility can be identified with inflation, then the present analysis suggests that inflation 
can decrease cost reducinginvestment, leading to a rugher average cost leve!. 
Appendix 
Lemma 2 
{
a - A(p;t"J)=0 
Differentiating the system 
p - R(a;p,t"J) "" O 
.. ' aa' 
ao ao 
"H-' roA, 
A. 
onegets 
~ ~ Ro R. 
ao ao 
+R'A,] 
+ Ra A 6 
en Fromthe system aboveit foUows that sgnl()p~ !()aj "" - sgn{()a~!()aj. 
withH =: 1- ApRa 
(H) If A&> O thenR6 + R..A6> O and A6+ R6Ap < O, thus sgnl3p~ j()o) =- sgn{oa"loil}. If A6< O, and -(R'¡ Ra) < 
A6< - R6Ap' then Ró + RaA6< Oand A6+ R6Ap < O, and therefore sgn{()p* !()o) '" sgn{oa*/oo}. «J[ 
Proposition 2 
(i) Follows from Lemma 2: (i) and the fact that at locally stable equilibria H > O. UsinS the envelope 
theorem: o[tl1l(p"'(C¡;OA) +(1- tI)1l(P"";o,chJl!oa=(l-/I) [()1l(p"";o,eh)/op] (op'" 130) < O. 
(ii) Follows from Lemma 2: (ti) and the fad that at locally stable equil:ibria H > O. UsinS the envelope 
theo,em: 3[¡m(p'("o,," + (1- #)n(p';o,,¡JV30" # [~n(p"('";O",)/~oJ + (1- p) [~n(p';o,'h)/~oJ + (1 - #) 
[3f[(p~;(lh)13Pl (op* 130), which has a potentially ambiguoussign. <JI 
Proposition 3 
Denote the entry costby F and the measureoffirms in the industry by e. Equilibrium is given by: 
{
a - Arp,e) 
p - R(ap) 
e ~ E(a,p;F) 
or alternatively by which gives 
ca, a, 23 
aa aF E,A. rO(A, + A.E,) 
a. a. 
=Ml R" EFAeRa aa aF with M=l- R.(Ap+A,E,) >0 
a, a, R.,E, 
aa aF 
thus 
iJa < O 
aa 
fJp > O 
aa 
EF(1- A~Ra) 
iJe > O 
aa ond 
ua > O 
aF 
vp < O 
aF 
{
e' ~ R(.) 
M>O followa frornlocal stability where the dynamicsystemis given by al "" A(Pt-l, el) 
el = E(at-l,pl~¡) 
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